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I. Introduction 
The Executive Order that created the Commission charges 
it with, among other tasks, "investigat[ing] weaknesses in 
existing laws, regulations and procedures regarding the selection 
of judges and ... determin[ing] whether such weaknesses create an 
undue potential for corruption, favoritism, undue influence 
or otherwise impair public confidence in the integrity of 
government." No task of this Commission is more important. 
Judges, as the personal embodiment of our American ideal of 
justice, occupy a unique place in our system of government and 
must be held to the highest standards of skill, independence, 
honesty and fairness. 
The Commission has found that New York State fails to 
choose its judges in the manner that best fosters the presence of 
these attributes on the bench. Indeed, some methods of judicial 
selection namely, judicial elections are so captive to the 
interests of political party organizations that they clash with 
the ideal of an independent and nonpartisan judiciary. By 
subordinating judicial values to political favoritism and party 
loyalty, judicial elections invite undue influence over judges 
and threaten public confidence in the integrity of the judicial 
system. 
Appointive as well as elective systems exist in New 
York State. Judges on our highest court -- the Court of Appeals 
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-- are appointed by the executive branch, as are judges on the 
Court of Claims, Criminal Court and, in New York City only, 
Family Court. In contrast, judges are elected to New York's 
court of general jurisdiction -- the Supreme Court -- as well as 
to the surrogate's, County, City, District, Civil and, outside of 
New York City, Family Courts. Furthermore, the laws provide a 
variety of methods both for appointing and for electing judges. 
Recognizing this complexity, the Commission has 
conducted an extensive investigation and study of judicial 
selection in New York State. We have interviewed approximately 
50 sitting and former judges around the state, and more than 60 
experts, political figures, spokespersons for various organiza-
tions concerned with judicial selection and other individuals 
acquainted with the selection of judges in various parts of the 
state. 1 The Commission also has subpoenaed or otherwise 
obtained relevant documents from different political organiza-
tions, from the New York State Board of Elections, and from 
various county Boards of Election. Finally, on March 3 and 
March 9, 1988, the Commission held public hearings concerning 
issues raised in the course of this investigation. 
lA number of individuals who provided information, 
including judges, asked that they not be publicly identified by 
the Commission. Still other individuals, including judges, 
declined to speak with us at all. For the sake of uniform 
treatment, an individual will not be identified by name in this 
report unless he or she gave public testimony before the Commission. 
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Our investigation has shown that the election of 
Supreme Court justices and judges of courts of limited 
jurisdiction2 is so intertwined with party politics that the 
process violates two principles basic to our ideal of an 
independent judiciary. First, a method of judicial selection 
should protect the judiciary as much as possible from pressures 
and concerns that may detract from the ability to be fair and 
impartial. The concern here is not only undue influence but the 
appearance of undue influence and its effect on public 
confidence. As Chief Judge Sol Wachtler testified at our 
hearings, "the whole justice system is balanced very delicately 
on what we call public trust. 11 3 The elective processes threaten 
this delicate balance by exposing judges, even after they have 
won party support, to political pressure arising from the need to 
maintain the favor of the party organizations that sponsored 
them. Even when judges resist this pressure, it places judicial 
independence in jeopardy. 
2By "courts of limited jurisdiction," we refer to the Court 
of Claims and to Surrogate's, County, City, District, Civil, 
Criminal and Family Courts. We do not consider in this report 
Town and Village Justices or Justices of the Peace. 
3I Tr. at 35. In this report, "I Tr." or "II Tr." refers to 
the transcript for the first or second day of the public 
hearings, respectively, followed by the page of the transcript. 
A list of all persons who testified or submitted written 
statements at the hearings is attached as Appendix A. 
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Second, a method of selecting judges should guarantee 
that the broadest possible pool of qualified candidates be 
considered for judgeships, without regard to political party 
support. Adherence to this principle not only ensures that 
candidates are treated fairly but also encourages the best 
potential judges to come forward and promotes their maximum 
representation on the bench. Elective systems, however, in 
granting control over judgeships to political party leaders in 
the various parts of the state, have made service and influence 
within party organizations usually a prerequisite to obtaining a 
judgeship. These systems unquestionably have produced many fine 
judges in our state's history. But the fact remains that 
candidates who lack a political connection, no matter how 
impressive their credentials, are usually excluded from 
consideration. 
Our investigation further persuades us that these 
defects in elective systems stem, not from individual abuses or 
unusual local circumstances, but from the inherently partisan 
nature of political party activity. While party control may be 
appropriate in the case of election to offices within the 
legislative or executive branches, in the case of judicial 
elections such control undermines the moral foundation of the 
judiciary by threatening its independence and nonpartisanship. 
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Appointive systems, by contrast, while also vulnerable 
to partisan politics, can be carefully designed to minimize the 
risks that politics poses to judicial independence and to fair 
access to the bench. For example, judicial nominating 
commissions, by nominating for possible appointment to the bench 
only a small number of candidates found to be well-qualified, can 
limit the executive's discretion over appointments and thus the 
role of partisan politics at the executive level. Moreover, if 
each nominating commission itself is nonpartisan or multi-
partisan and reflects a broad spectrum of community interests, 
then nominations are more likely to represent a genuine consensus 
of informed opinions rather than the will of a political leader 
or faction. In these and other ways, a well-designed appointive 
process can free sitting judges from at least those pressures 
that stem from dependence on political leaders. 
For these reasons, the Commission recommends abolition 
of the elective systems for selecting Supreme Court justices and 
judges of courts of limited jurisdiction in favor of an 
appointive system. The appointive process we recommend should 
have the following features: 
1. Nominating commissions should be established in 
each judicial district for Supreme Court nominations and in the 
appropriate geographical area for nominations to courts of 
limited jurisdiction. 
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2. The members of each nominating commission should 
be selected by a range of government authorities, including the 
Governor, the four majority and minority leaders of the New York 
State Senate and Assembly, the Chief Judge of New York State and 
the Presiding Justice of the relevant Appellate Division, and 
local authorities such as relevant mayors and county executives. 
3. These authorities should strive to achieve as 
broad a range of community representation on the commission as 
possible. To that end, limits should be set on the number of 
commission members who may belong to any one political party and 
who may be members of the bar. 
4. Each nominating commission, after actively 
recruiting and thoroughly scrutinizing judicial candidates 
pursuant to written, uniform procedures, should nominate for each 
vacancy a small number of candidates found well-qualified by a 
majority of the commission members. 
5. The executive vested with the authority to appoint 
judges from among these nominees should vary depending on the 
nature and jurisdiction of the court. The Governor, subject to 
confirmation by the State Senate, should appoint nominees to the 
Supreme Court, the Court of Claims and the Surrogate's Court. In 
the case of the other courts, the relevant county executive or 
mayor should make the appointments. 
6. The re-appointment of an incumbent judge should 
follow the same process within the nominating commission. The 
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commission members must decide by majority vote whether the 
incumbent is qualified to serve another term. If so, re-
appointment by the relevant executive should be automatic. 
7. Finally, each nominating commission should be 
required to compile and make publicly available certain 
statistical information on applicants, nominees and appointees, 
including information on the numbers of minority group and 
female applicants, nominees and appointees. 
In urging these recommendations, we do not suggest that 
an appointive system necessarily produces more qualified judges 
or fewer corrupt ones. We have found no persuasive evidence 
correlating systems of judicial selection with the quality and 
integrity of judges. Nor do we believe that politics can be 
banished completely from the selection of judges. What our 
investigation has shown is that elective systems are so infused 
with party politics that they do not and cannot protect the 
independence of the judiciary and promote the broad~st possible 
access to the bench, and that the threat to public confidence 
alone requires New York State to adopt less partisan 
alternatives. 
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II. Elective Systems 
This section provides, first, a brief overview of 
elective systems; second, a description and criticism of elective 
systems; third, a consideration of the most common arguments 
raised in favor of elective systems; and finally, our conclusions 
regarding these systems. 
A. Overview 
Judges in New York State are elected through one of two 
processes: a judicial nominating convention process, in the case 
of Supreme Court justices, or a primary process, in the case of 
judges of some courts of limited jurisdiction. These processes 
must be repeated for each judicial seat at the end of a fixed 
term, which is 14 years in the case of the Supreme Court and 
varies from four to 14 years for the other elective judgeships. 
Under the judicial nominating convention system, 
judicial candidates for each party are nominated by a vote of 
party delegates at a judicial convention. Each party holds its 
own nominating convention within each of the eleven judicial 
districts throughout the state. Party delegates are elected in 
primary elections preceding the nominating convention. Delegates 
in each district are not legally obligated to vote for any 
particular nominees. However, they may only elect as many 
Judicial Selection Report 
May 19, 1988 
Page 9 
nominees as there are Supreme Court vacancies.4 Independents 
can run for Supreme Court without party nomination, but they must 
comply with special petition requirements of the New York 
Election Law.5 
Under the primary system, candidates for judicial 
office who desire to enter a party primary must garner a 
specified number of petition signatures from members of that 
party in their locale (although the candidates themselves need 
not be a member of that party), and otherwise comply with the 
petition requirements of the New York Election Law. Only those 
candidates who satisfy these requirements may appear on the 
ballot on primary day.6 Typically, one or more candidates from 
within this group, corresponding to the number of court 
vacancies, carry the official designation of the party. On 
primary day, voters from each party choose from among the 
candidates from their party, thus narrowing the field of 
candidates from each party to the number of judicial seats 
available.7 
4see N.Y. Elec. Law sections 6-124 and 6-126 (McKinney 1978 
& Supp. 1988). 
5see id. at sections 6-138, 6-140 and 6-142. 
6see, ~' id. at sections 6-118 and 6-136. 
7see id. at section 6-160. 
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B. Description And Critique Of Judicial Elections 
Two telling facts emerge from the Commission's 
investigation into judicial elections: first, the choice of 
candidates usually rests with local party leaders who base their 
decisions in large part on political considerations; second, the 
party system exposes candidates to political pressures even after 
they have been nominated or designated for office. 
1. Queens County As An Illustration 
In its investigation, the Commission found that the 
elective systems in Queens County illustrate clearly the conflict 
between party politics and judicial values. Consequently, in 
this report we describe in detail the Queens systems as they 
have operated over the past ten to 15 years. In so doing, we do 
not mean to single out the practices in that county. Indeed, our 
investigation shows that the elective processes in Queens are in 
important ways representative of those in other areas of the 
state. 
Queens County politics is dominated by the Democratic 
Party, officially represented in Queens by the Queens Democratic 
Organization ("QDO"). The Democratic county leader in Queens 
(the chairman of the QDO) and important district leaders (heads 
of local Democratic organizations who sit on the Executive 
Committee of the QDO) control access to positions on both Supreme 
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Court and Civil Court.8 The district leaders refer the names of 
potential candidates to the county leader, who sends all names to 
the Queens County Bar Association and, at times in the past, to a 
screening panel established by the QDO. Then, after negotiations 
and discussions with district leaders, the county leader and his 
aides pare down the list of candidates found qualified. In the 
case of Civil Court candidates, the QDO Executive Committee 
eventually ratifies the county leader's choices of party 
designees. In the case of Supreme Court candidates, the 
political leadership reaches an informal ·agreement on the party's 
nominees before the nominating convention. After the QDO 
officially designates and nominates its candidates, the 
organization assists in the petition process and the election 
campaigns. 
In Queens, the official support of the Democratic 
Party almost always assures election. None of the many persons 
with whom we spoke could recall any instance since the mid-1970's 
when a Supreme Court candidate backed by the QDO was not 
nominated at the convention. And only on a handful of occasions 
in the last 15 years has a candidate designated by the QDO 
failed to win the Civil Court Democratic primary. Success in the 
Democratic primary or at the Democratic convention has been and 
Bcivil Court positions are the only judgeships in Queens 
obtainable through the primary process. 
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still is "tantamount to election. 11 9 
In New York State there are, of course, variations in 
elective processes from place to place. At least two kinds of 
variations are significant and should be explained here. First, 
in some jurisdictions, such as New York County, political party 
structure is not as monolithic as it is in Queens, but rather is 
divided into competing factions. As a result, in these areas 
political control over the primary designation and judicial 
nominating convention processes may be less centralized than it 
is in Queens. Whereas in Queens the county leader can usually 
rely on unanimity within his organization by the time the party 
designates or nominates its candidates, in other areas two or 
more factions may vie to designate or nominate their candidates. 
Second, in some jurisdictions, no one political party 
predominates to the degree that the Democratic Party does in 
Queens. To the extent there is real competition between parties, 
general elections are more closely contested and perhaps more 
closely followed by the voting public. 
These variations, however, do not alter our fundamental 
conclusion that the state's elective systems as a whole fail to 
protect judicial independence and to promote the broadest 
possible access to the bench. Relatively decentralized 
9r Tr. at 111 (Weprin). 
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management of the primary and convention processes, for example, 
may affect the type of political control exerted over judgeships 
but it does not lessen the relevance of political connections to 
judicial selection or reduce political pressures on party 
designees. And contested elections, while arguably a gain for 
democracy, pose other threats to judicial independence by 
compelling some judicial candidates to raise large sums of 
campaign money or to become dependent on the resources of 
political organizations. 
2. Elective Systems Fail To Assure All Qualified 
Candidates Access To The Bench 
a. Political Control Over Elective Systems 
Closes Nominating Conventions And, To A 
Lesser Extent, Primaries To Candidates 
Who Lack Party Organization Backing 
In virtually every county in the state, the party 
nomination for Supreme Court is in the hands of a small group of 
political leaders, typically the county leader, other top 
officials of his or her organization, and local political figures 
with sufficient power to make claims upon the county 
organization. And in most counties, these same leaders exercise 
similar control over the party designation for judicial 
primaries. Political party control over judicial elections is 
most clearly revealed at the Supreme Court nominating convention. 
The convention, as Assemblyman and Queens District Leader Saul 
Weprin testified at our public hearings, "really operates as a 
.., 
.. 
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rubber stamp of the county leader. 11 10 
In Queens, the convention delegates are invariably 
hand-picked by the district leaders and usually elected unopposed 
on party slates. Accordingly, the delegates need little 
persuasion to do the leaders' bidding. Indeed, the 
organization's choices are nominated routinely because the 
conventions are "pretty well-orchestrated," with "scripts" 
supplied beforehand to the delegates.11 
One individual who served for several years as a 
delegate at the Queens judicial convention told us that, 
typically, he and other delegates would not receive notification 
of their election as delegates from the Board of Elections until 
just before the nominating convention. Thus, he attended the 
conventions without advance knowledge of the candidates. He also 
confirmed that a pre-set script determined the course of the 
convention. According to this former delegate, the delegates 
were well aware that the county leader chose the nominees prior 
to the nominating convention. Only after the nominations, in the 
experience of this former delegate, were delegates afforded the 
opportunity to meet the candidates. 
lOI Tr. at 105-106. 
llI Tr. at 107 (Weprin). 
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The QDO's success in the primary elections for Civil 
Court seats, while not as complete as in the Supreme Court 
nominating conventions, also testifies to its power over the 
judicial selection process. QDO-backed civil Court candidates 
have available to them the resources of the QDO and the local 
Democratic clubs. Club workers collect signatures, prepare the 
petitions, litigate petition challenges, and distribute campaign 
literature. Candidates backed by the organization also carry the 
official designation of the Democratic Party. These advantages 
are particularly telling in judicial elections, in which voter 
knowledge of individual candidates is often quite limited and 
voters more often than not vote according to party labels.12 
Those few independent Democrats who win judicial 
primaries against QDO-backed candidates sometimes pay a price. 
One such individual who won election to Civil Court has spent 
many years there, despite both his proclaimed desire to join the 
Supreme Court bench and the ascendancy of many other Civil Court 
judges with fewer years of judicial experience. Since his 
election to Civil Court, the judge has attempted to win the 
organization's good graces by hiring QDO-recommended law 
secretaries. He told us this was "part of making the peace. You 
don't want to make enemies with people who determine whether you 
12see the discussion of voter participation in judicial 
elections at pp. 36-41 below. 
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get redesignated." 
The political realities of the nominating convention 
are not affected by variations in political conditions throughout 
the state. Even in locales with a less unified party structure 
than exists in Queens, candidates must still obtain the support 
of party leaders who control blocs of delegates. In the Bronx, 
where the Democratic organization has been in disarray, Justice 
Frank Torres won election to the Supreme Court as the Democratic 
nominee in 1987. Justice Torres testified at the Commission's 
public hearings that, after years of being absent from politics, 
he was compelled "to make the political connections to influence 
those that you recognize are key towards the development of 
support at the Judicial Convention. 11 13 Even when a script does 
not control the course of the convention, the fact remains that, 
in Justice Torres' words, "there are a few dozen key people who 
control [the] delegates and who control the outcome of the 
convention. 1114 
Two additional examples from our hearings make the same 
point. Court of Claims Judge Joan Carey testified to her 
repeated frustration in seeking a Supreme Court nomination at 
several judicial conventions in New York County. Despite her 
13rr Tr. at 142. 
14rr Tr. at 145. 
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high rating from the local Democratic screening panel and her 
attempts to discuss substantive issues such as court reform with 
convention delegates, she found them unwilling or unable to 
address her candidacy on the merits. She testified that "there 
is no way in which ... a delegate really examines the 
qualifications of the particular candidate," and indeed the 
results of all but one of the four conventions she attended were 
determined in advance.15 
Justice David Levy of the Bronx told an even more 
striking story of convention politics. In 1979, Justice Levy, a 
reform Democratic candidate, was denied nomination by one vote 
after eleventh-hour lobbying by Democratic politicians in the 
Bronx and Manhattan16 caused even sympathetic district leaders to 
desert him. In the next year, 1980, Justice Levy was excluded 
from meaningful consideration because the Bronx Democratic 
organization and Manhattan reformers struck a deal in which the 
two groups divided between themselves the two vacant Supreme 
Court seats, thus shutting out Justice Levy and other Bronx 
reformers. Finally, in 1981, Justice Levy easily obtained the 
nomination after using the political power of his reform group to 
reach an accommodation with Bronx Democratic leader Stanley 
15I Tr. at 185-95, 214. 
16until 1981, the Bronx and Manhattan comprised a single 
judicial district and consequently judicial nominating 
conventions included delegates from each borough. 
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Friedman. Justice Levy stated that in each of these years the 
pivotal factor at the convention was a political "deal" of some 
kind. 17 
In the upstate judicial districts as well, the 
nominating convention fits Assemblyman Weprin's description of a 
"rubber stamp." Delegates are selected by and loyal to county 
leaders, and as a result the nomination process usually proceeds 
without debate. Similarly, party designees upstate usually run 
unopposed within the party and therefore do not have primary 
races. Many knowledgeable people mentioned the time and expense 
of campaigning without party organization support as one reason 
for the absence of primary competition in upstate counties. 
b. Political Service And Influence In 
The Party Organization Is Almost 
Always A Prerequisite To Receiving The 
Organization's Support 
For party leaders, the tremendous power they exercise 
over judgeships is first and foremost a political asset, not a 
public trust. As Chief Judge Wachtler observed at the public 
hearings, "[n)o political leader has been given the mandate to 
improve the judiciary, and that really isn't on the political 
leader's agenda. 11 18 Queens illustrates three aspects concerning 
17II Tr. at 52-66, 82-88. 
18 I Tr. at 34. 
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this agenda: first, past political service to a local club or 
the county organization is of paramount importance in the 
selection of judges; second, in the discussions leading to the 
selection of the party organization's candidates, political 
leaders often bargain over judgeships; and third, there is no 
assurance that political leaders will select the most qualified 
judicial candidates. 
(i) The Importance Of Political Service 
Local Democratic Party clubs are the basic building 
blocks of the QDO because they serve as the power base of the 
district leaders who comprise its leadership. As Queens District 
Leader Archie Spigner stated at our hearings, district leaders 
have a family, and that's a clubhouse .... [T]hey 
have a clubhouse which they have to respond to, 
and you just can't maintain the support of your 
club if you do not reward ... the club .... 
[District leaders are) not very successful if 
[they] don't have a clubi because ... that's your 
family, your supporters. 9 
Almost all t he Democratic judges in Queens whom we 
interviewed were members of local Democratic clubs prior to 
becoming judges. Through these clubs many performed services for 
the party, such as gathering signatures for petitions, 
distributing campaign literature and volunteering legal 
assistance in election cases . We learned from several witnesses 
19rr Tr. at 1 65-66. 
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that district leaders almost invariably choose to support 
judicial candidates who have been active in their clubs or who 
have been recommended by others who were active. The preferences 
of the county leader, too, are based largely on a person's past 
assistance to the party. 
Moreover, the right political affiliation may enable a 
judge to rise to higher judicial office more swiftly. For 
example, Justice Nat Hentel was a Republican when he was elected 
to the Queens Civil Court, where he remained for 18 years. After 
15 years on that bench, Justice Hentel became a Democrat; three 
years later, he won the party's nomination to the Supreme Court. 
Justice Hentel testified that many Democratic Civil Court judges 
junior to him were nominated to Supreme Court ahead of him 
because "they were active in the community and were active in the 
political life of the community before they went on the bench. 11 20 
Assemblyman Weprin succinctly summarized the current 
system in Queens: 
The person who is active in the 
political process will certainly have a 
much better chance to be designated, and 
many people who probably would be very 
capable judges are probably ruled out of 
the system that way.21 
20rr Tr. at 18-19. 
21r Tr. at 120. 
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Assemblyman Weprin also testified that "being active in civics, 
politics, community organizations, religious organizations [has) 
something to do with being a good judge. 11 22 Yet other well-
qualified, civic-minded individuals who choose not to serve the 
Democratic organization or local clubs are by that fact excluded 
from consideration for judgeships. 
(ii) The Role Of Political Bargaining 
The process by which the Queens county leader and 
district leaders reach agreement on the party's candidates is 
one of bald political bargaining. Since the QDO chairman is 
elected by the district leaders and needs their support, he has a 
strong interest in keeping as many of them as happy as possible. 
This is no less true for the allocation of judgeships than the 
allocation of other political benefits. Councilman Spigner 
characterized the process as: 
balancing the equities .... (A] County Leader 
... has to have the support of the majority 
of the 64 [district) leaders to get elected, 
so in order for him to maintain his support 
system, he has got to satisfy ... the 
majority of the leaders. 
By the same token, according to Councilman Spigner, a district 
leader will "withdraw" his or her candidate ''in the interest of 
harmony" when he or she sees that "it's not my turn. 11 23 The 
22r Tr. at 124. 
23rr Tr. at 167-68, 173. 
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process, in essence, is one of mutual accommodation to political 
power. As Councilman Spigner testified, the selection process 
works the same "whether it be for judgeships or for legislative 
posts."24 
Queens judges themselves have characterized their 
election in terms of political trading. In one case, a judge 
told us in substance that he believed his nomination was a 
political favor from the county leader to the judge's district 
leader. Judges also spoke of their chances in terms of whether 
it was their "turn" to get "the nod", that is, the designation or 
nomination. One judge told us that "my time had come. I had 
been passed over again and again, and I had been a good boy." 
(iii) The Lack Of Assurance That The Most 
Qualified Candidates Will Be Endorsed 
This emphasis upon political criteria provides no 
assurance that political leaders will endorse the most qualified 
candidates, even from among those who have been politically 
active. Councilman Spigner, for example, explained at the 
hearings how he determines which candidates to sponsor for 
judgeships in Queens: 
(I]t's based on friendships, 
relationships built up over the years. 
For example, there's a young man that 
goes to my Church who has been -- I've 
24rr Tr. at 162. 
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known him since he was a Little Leaguer, 
so now he's a lawyer, and he also 
belongs to my political club, and I sort 
of look to the day when I will be able 
to nominate him for a judgeship, you 
know. So that's a particular personal 
relationship. If you run out of 
friends, then you look to see other 
considerations .... Obviously, the only 
requirements that I know of for being a 
judge ... is having been admitted for 
ten years, and I don't even know of any 
other objective test besides that. I 
don't know of any other official 
requirement So if you have been 
admitted to practice and you are 
without any experiences of a negative 
nature, I assume that on the face of it, 
that qualifies you to become a judge.25 
Councilman Spigner later added, "I certainly would not nominate 
anyone who would be an embarrassment or had displayed tendencies 
or who was inarticulate or who did not have the respect of his 
colleagues. 11 26 
The essentially political nature of these deliberations 
is not unique to Queens. To the extent that party leaders 
control access to elective processes and outcomes at the 
conventions or primaries, political considerations such as party 
service and clout within the organization will loom large in the 
selection of judges. And screening committees, where they do 
exist, as in Queens, do not offset the influence of partisan 
politics. At best, they help ensure that the party endorses 
25rr Tr. at 163-64; see also I Tr. at 98 (Weprin). 
26rr Tr. at 178. 
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judges who are qualified as well as politically connected, not 
that candidates who are qualified but lack political connections 
are also seriously considered. Furthermore, at present no 
statute or rule prevents the county leader from simply refusing 
to abide by the decisions of the screening committee and 
supporting candidates found to be unqualified. 
c. Even The Renomination Of A Sitting 
Judge Can Be Subject To Politics 
One of the most striking problems with elective systems 
is that demonstrably well-qualified judges can be denied 
renomination at the end of their terms because of the whims of 
political leaders. While many party organizations, including the 
QDO, have adopted the practice of supporting the renomination of 
any judicial incumbent who has demonstrated basic competence, no 
law or regulation prevents this custom from being breached. 
Thus, in the words of Chief Judge Wachtler, an incumbent judge is 
"entirely at the mercy of a political process that may give 
little or no regard to his or her demonstrated capacity to 
serve, 11 27 as several dramatic examples in recent years 
illustrate. 
In 1983, the Bronx Democratic organization denied 
Justice Donald Sullivan renomination, despite his excellent 
27r Tr. at 16. 
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reputation as a judge and the conclusion by various bar 
associations that he was qualified. Former Justice Sullivan 
testified that when he called Stanley Friedman, the county 
leader, for an explanation, he was simply told that "political 
considerations" precluded his renomination.28 
Similarly, Judge Stuart Namm testified that the 
dominant Suffolk County Republican Party refused to endorse his 
re-election to District Court in 1981, in effect condemning him 
to defeat, even though he had received the highest rating from 
the Suffolk County Bar Association. Judge Namm explained that 
the Republican Party refused to endorse him because he was a 
Democrat. Two years later a similar fate befell Leon Lazer, a 
well-respected Supreme Court Justice in Suffolk County, when the 
Republican organization in Suffolk County decided for political 
reasons to end the practice of cross-endorsing incumbent judges 
who were Democrats.29 Moreover, since 1984 the Republican Party 
in Nassau County has also declined to cross-endorse Democratic 
judges, with the result that at least five sitting judges in 
County, District and Family Courts have failed to win re-
election. 
28I Tr. at 156, 173. 
29I Tr. at 126 (Weprin); II Tr. at 205-09 (Namm). 
~1 
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Incumbent judges are no more secure upstate, even in 
judicial districts with informal traditions of cross-
endorsements. In recent years, sitting judges with fine records 
in at least two such districts -- the Seventh and the Eighth 
have been denied politically important cross-endorsements, 
although in many cases the affected judge still won re-election. 
such patently partisan behavior deprives the judicial 
system of the services of not only sitting judges but also 
potential candidates for judicial office. As Chief Judge 
Wachtler observed at our public hearings, "[c]apable candidates 
for judicial office may be discouraged from seeking such office, 
knowing that periodically they must contend with the 
vicissitude[s] of the partisan political process in order to 
remain in office. 11 30 
3. Elective Systems Also Expose Judges To Political 
Pressures Even After They Obtain Party Support 
Our investigation has revealed a number of ways in 
which pressure on judges to maintain the favor of the party, 
whether to assure support for another term or merely to show 
loyalty, can threaten judicial independence. 
30I Tr. at 16-17. 
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a. Judges May Feel Obligated To Contribute 
To Local Political Organizations 
By law, judicial candidates are prohibited from making 
any contribution, directly or indirectly, in connection with an 
election or nomination for election. 31 However, judges who are 
announced candidates for another elective judicial office are 
permitted by an Office of Court Administration (''OCA") rule to 
purchase "a ticket to a politically sponsored dinner or other 
affair" from nine months before the primary or nominating 
convention until six months after the general election. 32 This 
31see N.Y. Elec. Law, supra, sections 17-162 and 14-100. 
32Rules Of The Chief Administrator Of Courts, Section 100.7, 
22 N.Y.C.R.R. Section 100.7 (1986), states as follows: 
No judge during a term of off ice shall hold any office in 
a political party or organization or contribute to any political 
party or political campaign or take part in any political 
campaign except his or her own campaign for elective judicial 
office. Political activity prohibited by this section includes: 
(a) The purchase, directly or indirectly, of tickets 
to politically sponsored dinners or other affairs, or 
attendance at such dinners or other affairs, including 
dinners or affairs sponsored by a political organization for 
a nonpolitical purpose, except as follows: 
(1) This limitation shall not apply during a 
period beginning nine months before a primary election, 
judicial nominating convention, party caucus or other 
party meeting for nominating a candidate for elective 
judicial office for which the judge is an announced 
candidate, or for which a committee or other 
organization has publicly solicited or supported his or 
her candidacy, and ending, if the judge is a candidate 
in the general election for that office, six months 
after the general election. If the judge is not a 
candidate in the general election, this period shall 
end on the date of the primary election, convention, 
caucus or meeting. 
(2) During the period defined in paragraph (1) of 
this subdivision: 
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limited exemption is designed to allow judicial candidates to 
contact political leaders in order to be able to compete for 
political support.33 
our review of documents received from the QDO as well 
as from the State and New York City Boards of Elections shows, 
however, that a number of Democratic judges in Queens appear to 
(i) A judge may attend a fundraising dinner 
or affair on behalf of the judge's own candidacy, 
but may not personally solicit contributions at 
such dinner or affair. 
(ii) Notwithstanding subdivision (bl of this 
section, a judge may purchase a ticket to a 
politically sponsored dinner or other affair even 
where the regular cost of a ticket to such dinner 
or affair exceeds the proportionate cost of the 
dinner or affair. 
(iii) Notwithstanding subdivisions (c) and 
(d) of this section, a judge may attend a 
politically sponsored dinner or affair in support 
of a slate of candidates, and may appear on 
podiums or in photographs on political literature 
with the candidates who make up that slate, 
provided that the judge is part of the slate of 
candidates. 
(b) Contributions, directly or indirectly, to any 
political campaign for any office or for any political 
activity. Where the judge is a candidate for judicial 
office, reference should be made to the Election Law. 
(c) Participation, either directly or indirectly, in 
any political campaign for any office, except his or her own 
campaign for elective judicial office. 
(d) Being a member of or serving as an officer or 
functionary of any political club or organization or being 
an officer of any political party or permitting his or her 
name to be used in connection with any activity of such 
political party, club, or organization. 
(e) Any other activity of a partisan political nature. 
(Emphasis added.) 
33r Tr. at 16, 23 (Wachtler). 
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have purchased more than "a ticket" to a particular event. A 
ticket to one of the several annual QDO functions has cost over 
the years between $50 and $250. Yet one Civil Court judge, for 
example, spent $1,000 toward the purchase of tickets for one QDO 
event during the year he was elected to Supreme Court. In many 
cases, moreover, a judge's spouse, other family members, friends 
or campaign committees purchased additional tickets to QDO 
affairs. 
Equally noteworthy are the lengths to which some judges 
have gone to purchase tickets. Several Queens judges told us 
that, every year following their election to Civil Court, they 
gave official notice that they were candidates for Supreme Court 
so that, as "announced candidates," they could purchase tickets 
to and attend QDO functions without running afoul of the OCA 
rule. In some cases, this notice was given regardless of whether 
the judges believed they would be a serious contender for a 
Supreme Court nomination. Indeed, one judge recalled contacting 
someone at the QDO once and saying, "don't get angry ... I know 
I'm not going to get the nomination but I'm going to send out the 
letter to say I'm a candidate so that I can give money." In this 
fashion, the judge explained, it was possible to "keep in 
contact" with the party even though the judge knew it was not yet 
time to get the "nod." 
J 
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Chief Judge Wachtler testified at our hearings about 
this practice, which he described as "perverse" and a "distortion 
of the ethical canons." According to the Chief Judge, "there 
are judges who haven't missed a political dinner any year during 
their term of office as judge. 11 34 He also pointed out that, in 
order to be able to attend these dinners, judges to whom no 
higher off ice is available sometimes announce their candidacies 
for another vacancy for the same office.35 
Leaving aside what the rules allow, extensive ticket-
buying creates at least the appearance of a politically dependent 
rather than an independent judiciary. Although the judges we 
interviewed denied that the QDO explicitly pressured or asked 
them to purchase tickets to QDO affairs, several judges told us 
they thought their purchase of tickets to QDO affairs was 
"expected". Another judge told us that "no one had to force you 
to do anything." He just "knew" to purchase tickets and attend 
the affairs. He also admitted that, had there been explicit 
pressure from the organization, he would have acceded to it. 
This judge also said he believed that if he did "all the required 
things" while he was a Civil Court judge, he would eventually 
become a Supreme Court justice. Another judge told us that 
purchasing tickets to QDO functions was "a way of saying thank 
34I Tr. a 15-16; see also II Tr. at 223 (Namm). 
35I Tr. at 25-26. 
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you" to the party. In fact, in many of the cases we examined, 
Queens Democratic judges' contributions to the QDO through ticket 
purchases peaked during the year they were elected to the Civil 
or Supreme Court. 
One Queens judge talked to us at length on this 
subject. He said that the QDO "wants all the people to come that 
they can get to come .... (N]o one ever told me that I had to do 
X, Y, or Z in that context (of obtaining a judgeship] but 
certainly the word got to me that we're going to need money and 
therefore you're going to need to get people to come." The judge 
said he was asked, "How many tables do you think you can sell for 
us to get money?" This same judge's campaign committee 
coordinator told us that the committee gave approximately $5,000 
to the QDO for the purchase of tickets because that was the 
custom. 
In some cases, purchases by Queens judges and their 
campaign committees of tickets to QDO affairs and to political 
affairs at local Democratic clubs constituted a substantial 
portion of their total campaign expenditures. For instance, the 
campaign disclosure statements of one successful Supreme Court 
candidate reflect that, of approximately two thousand dollars in 
campaign expenditures, almost one-half was spent on the purchase 
of tickets to QDO affairs and an additional 30 percent on tickets 
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to local Democratic club affairs. Thus, contributions to 
fundraisers sponsored by Democratic political leaders constituted 
nearly 80 percent of the judge's total campaign expenditures. In 
another instance, after a victorious Supreme Court campaign, a 
Queens judge's campaign committee gave the balance of its funds 
-- several thousand dollars -- to the QDO. 
b. Judges May Be Keenly Aware Of Their Re-election 
Chances When Deciding Politically Sensitive Cases 
Many elected judges with whom we spoke view with 
trepidation the prospect of seeking political support for 
renomination or redesignation at the end of their terms. Not 
only is this effort distracting and to some demeaning,36 but it 
may fail. The inherent uncertainty of winning political support 
can have a chilling effect on a judge's exercise of his duties. 
Justice Hentel of Queens was asked at our public hearings if he 
would feel special pressure in deciding a case involving the law 
partner of a political leader who could help determine his 
judicial career. Justice Hentel responded candidly: 
I'm human .... I would think about it. I would 
struggle with it .... I shouldn't have to think 
about it. I shouldn't have my energies dissipated 
in wondering what the reaction is going to be or 
how I'm going to kill myself for the next 
election. It takes some guts, but that's the 
system. It should be changed.37 
36I Tr. 192-95 (Carey); II Tr. at 146-47 (Torres). 
37II Tr. at 36, 38. 
1 
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races.39 In 1980, the two most heavily financed Supreme Court 
races were held in the Seventh and Eighth Districts, the only two 
districts that year with competitive Supreme Court races. In the 
Seventh District, Supreme Court campaigns averaged more than 
$55,000. In the 1980's, these costs have skyrocketed. Anthony 
Palermo, an attorney in Rochester and Chairman of the Fourth 
Department Screening Committee, testified that five years ago 
Supreme Court election campaigns cost as much as $100,000 in 
Rochester.40 According to Board of Elections records, in a 1986 
Supreme Court race in Rensselaer County, in the Third District, 
the two candidates raised and spent a combined total of more than 
$140,000. 
The New York Code of Judicial Conduct bars judges from 
learning the identities of contributors to their campaign 
committees.41 This rule, however, is unrealistic. We learned in 
our investigation that judges frequently discover the identities 
of contributors through their attendance at fundraising events. 
Moreover, the rule fails to address the appearance problems that 
39Judicial Elections In New York, Voter Participation And 
Campaign Financing Of State Supreme Court Elections 1978, 1979 
and 1980, 4, 18 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1982) ("Judicial 
Elections In New York 1978-1980"). 
40II Tr. at 255, 264. 
4lsee N.Y. Code Of Jud. Conduct, Canon 7B(2) and Commentary, 
N.Y. Jud. Law (McKinney 1975). 
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follow from extensive fundraising by judges. For example, 
according to Mr. Palermo, judicial campaign committees in the 
Seventh Judicial District sometimes seek contributions "from 
those who appear before the (judges], primarily lawyers and so 
forth. 11 42 In 1978 through 1980, almost 40 per cent of the 
reported contributions to Supreme Court judicial campaign 
committees statewide were made by lawyers.43 
c. The Arguments In Support Of Elective Systems 
The proponents of judicial elections most often cite 
three arguments in support of their position: first, that the 
democratic values of our government are best served by giving the 
people the power to choose judges; second, that elective systems 
are more sensitive than other systems to the judicial aspirations 
of minority groups and women; and third, that the involvement of 
judges in local party politics is on balance beneficial because 
it best insures that they will know and appreciate the needs of 
their community and be able to temper the law with common sense. 
The Commission believes, after studying the record we 
have compiled, that these arguments either lack substance or 
pale beside the considerations that militate against the election 
of judges. 
42II Tr. at 255. 
43Judicial Elections In New York 1978-1980, supra, at 4-5. 
Judicial Selection Report 
May 19, 1988 
Page 36 
1. Democratic Values 
The short answer to the democratic argument in favor of 
electing judges is that elective processes in fact have little 
to do with democracy, beyond the basic ability of the voter to 
pull the lever based on party affiliation. Moreover, the real 
choice is made, not in the voting booth, but well before, in the 
nominating process and in the primary designation process, and 
neither of these processes is more than marginally responsive to 
popular will. Consequently, the sharp conflict that elective 
systems engender between partisan politics and judicial values is 
in no sense offset or justified by democratic principles. 
In the nominating convention system, a few political 
leaders select in advance, with little or no public input, the 
candidates whom the convention will nominate. To be sure, the 
public plays a role in the election of judicial delegates, but 
these delegates usually have been hand-picked by party leaders 
and follow their will. Moreover, the public has virtually no 
choice of delegates since they usually run unopposed on party 
slates. Thus, conventions even in jurisdictions where party 
structure is fragmented into many factions, such as New York 
County, run according to the agenda of a relative few and with no 
meaningful popular participation. As Judge Carey, a candidate at 
New York County conventions, testified, "there is no way in which 
a delegate really examines the qualifications of the 
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particular candidate." Accordingly, there is "just no connection 
[between] the citizens and the people who are running."44 
Nor is democratic reform of the convention process a 
realistic possibility. As long as delegates owe their seats to 
the party and not to the voters, conventions will not reflect 
popular will. In theory, contested delegate races could 
democratize the conventions. But a high percentage of contested 
delegate races is unlikely for several reasons. First, in order 
to have any real voice at the convention, non-organization 
candidates would have to win a large bloc of delegate seats. 
Such a hurdle, combined with the time and money involved in 
campaigning for election, may deter non-organization candidates 
from running at all. This analysis applies to conventions with 
rival delegate blocs as well as to more monolithic conventions. 
Second, voter interest in delegate races is extremely 
low. In 1983, for example, only 39 of 115 delegate races in New 
York County were contested, and approximately 8,000 (two percent) 
of the county's registered Democrats voted; in Brooklyn, only 12 
of 140 delegate races were contested, and less than 1,000 (0.2 
percent) of the registered Democrats voted; in the Bronx, 
approximately half of the delegate races were contested and less 
than 15,000 (eight percent) of the registered Democrats voted; 
44I Tr. at 212, 214. 
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and, in Suffolk and Nassau Counties, there were no contested 
delegate elections in either the Democratic or the Republican 
parties.45 
The primary system allows only marginally more popular 
participation than the convention system. Candidates designated 
by the local party organization are chosen by the same party 
leaders that select Supreme Court candidates, and according to 
the same criteria. And designation usually ensures that 
candidates will reach the general election, for one of two 
reasons. First, in many if not most cases there is no primary 
because the designated candidate runs unopposed. For example, no 
Democratic Party primaries were held in more than 70 percent of 
the New York City Civil Court elections held between 1980 and 
1985.46 Similarly, between 1980 and 1985 primaries were held in 
less than 30 percent of all Surrogate's Court races across the 
state. These primaries were held in only six counties: Broome, 
Dutchess, Erie, Jefferson, New York and Suffolk Counties.47 
45Judicial Elections In New York, Voter Participation And 
Campaign Financing Of State Supreme Court Elections 1981, 1982 
and 1983, 51-52, 59, 62 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1984) 
(''Judicial Elections In New York 1981-1983"). 
46The Illusion Of Democracy: New York City Civil Court 
Elections 1980-1985, 15 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1986). 
47surrogate's Court Elections In New York State 1980-1985, 
10-12 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1986). 
Judicial Selection Report 
May 19, 1988 
Page 39 
Alternatively, when there are primary contests, party 
designation is a significant asset. It entitles the candidate to 
the substantial resources -- especially assistance and advice in 
the petition process and the election campaign -- that the party 
organization can confer. Moreover, party designation itself 
carries great weight. Judicial candidates are barred from 
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues, 48 
which makes it extremely difficult for the public to evaluate 
judicial candidates except on the basis of their records. Yet, 
as Judge Carey testified, the public usually takes little 
interest in judicial candidates' records and backgrounds.49 In 
such circumstances, a candidate's designation as the official 
candidate of the party can be decisive. Low citizen awareness of 
the issues is probably also the reason why a number of judicial 
primaries appear to have been decided by such arbitrary factors 
as the location of candidates' names on the ballot,50 or the 
perception of a given candidate as a member of a particular 
ethnic group. Party labels, or other kinds of labels, fill the 
vacuum created by voter ignorance or disinterest. 
Similar factors -- uncontested races, lack of voter 
participation, and dependence on party labels -- also make 
48N.Y. Code Of Jud. Conduct, supra, Canon 7B(l) (c). 
49I Tr. at 203-205, 213-14. 
50 See, ~, II Tr. at 49-50 (Levy). 
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general elections less than meaningful exercises in democracy. 
For example, in 1978 through 1983 approximately 87% of the 
Supreme Court races throughout the state were either uncontested 
or noncompetitive.51 The majority of these races were 
uncontested or noncompetitive because of the general dominance of 
one party. But even in the Third, Seventh and Eighth Judicial 
Districts, where one party is not generally dominant, only 
approximately one-third of the Supreme Court races during this 
period were competitive. One reason for this low figure is that 
political leaders from different parties often agree to cross-
endorse candidates. In 1982, for example, all eight Supreme 
Court vacancies in the Third and Eighth Districts were filled in 
this manner -- the Republicans cross-endorsed four Democratic 
candidates, and the Democrats cross-endorsed four Republican 
candidates.52 
Moreover, voter participation in judicial elections is 
often extremely low. For instance, only approximately 30 percent 
of the eligible voters participated in the general elections 
between 1978 and 1980 and approximately 20 percent of these 
voters failed to vote for a Supreme Court candidate.53 
51Judicial Elections In New York 1981-1983, supra, at 79. A 
noncompetitive race is a contested election in which the winner 
obtains more than 55 percent of the vote. Id. 
52Id. at 28, 37, 79. 
53Judicial Elections In New York 1978-1980, supra, at 4-5. 
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Similarly, only 8.3 percent of all the Surrogate's Court 
elections in New York State between 1980 and 1985 were 
competitive, and roughly 18 percent of those who voted in the 
general elections in those years did not vote for a Surrogate's 
Court candidate.54 
Finally, one example may show how dependent judicial 
voting is on party labels. In 1982, when the Manhattan 
Democratic organization failed to file nominating papers for its 
candidates, the voters had no Democratic endorsements to guide 
them in local judicial races. As a result, approximately 58 
percent of those Manhattan voters who cast a ballot for governor 
that year failed to vote for a Supreme Court candidate -- more 
than twice the statewide rate of such failure.55 
In short, judicial elections do not significantly 
promote democratic values. 
2. Minority Representation On The Bench 
The Commission shares the concern that qualified 
judicial candidates who are women and members of minority groups 
be fairly represented on the bench. While some progress has been 
54surrogate's Court Elections In New York State 1980-1985, 
supra, at 9, 19. 
55Judicial Elections In New York 1981-83, supra, at 15, 19-
20, 75-76. 
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made, that goal is far from being achieved in New York State. 
However, there is no evidence to suggest that elective systems 
are more responsive to the aspirations of underrepresented groups 
than appointive systems and, indeed, there is considerable 
evidence to the contrary. 
At our public hearings we heard persuasive criticisms 
of the elective systems in New York City on just this score.56 
Justice Torres of the Bronx, for example, after noting that 
Hispanic judges held only 16 out of over 500 state and federal 
judgeships in New York City, told the Commission that 13 of these 
16 judgeships had been attained through appointive rather than 
elective processes. Justice Torres concluded: 
[I]f you analyze the extent to which 
positions have been gained, essentially it 
reflects the opportunity presented by the 
merit selection [i.e., appointive] system, 
not by the political process of nomination 
and election .... [This] would tend to point 
to the merit selection system as the system 
that provides opportunity rather than that of 
the political process.57 
5 6II Tr. at 132-137, 153 (Torres); II Tr. at 190-92 
(Spigner). 
57II Tr. at 137. In addition, Terri Austin, an attorney and 
member of the board of the Metropolitan Black Bar Association, 
testified at our hearings on behalf of that organization. Ms. 
Austin criticized the present performance of appointive systems 
in appointing blacks and other minorities to the bench in New 
York City, but concluded that either an appointive or an elective 
system could be designed to rectify this problem. II Tr. at 93, 
104-106. Ms. Austin also strongly recommended that judicial 
nominating conventions be abolished. II Tr. at 96-97. 
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Indeed, at least one of the current appointive 
committees in New York State -- the Mayor's Committee on the 
Judiciary in New York City -- appoints to the bench a relatively 
high percentage of the female and minority candidates who apply, 
although these groups are underrepresented in the applicant pool 
itself .58 Nationwide studies also show that appointive systems 
are more sensitive to the aspirations of minority groups and 
women than are elective systems.59 Accordingly, the persistent 
58of the appointive systems we surveyed on this point, the 
Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary provided us with the most 
extensive data for assessing its efficacy in placing women and 
minority groups on the bench. During the years 1978-87, 
minorities (male and female) comprised 10.7 percent of the total 
applicants seeking appointment by the Mayor's Committee to 
Criminal or Family Court: of these applicants, 44.9 percent were 
approved by the Committee and ultimately 59.1 percent of those 
approved were appointed by Mayor Koch to Criminal or Family 
Court. Non-minorities (male and female) comprised 89.3 percent 
of the total applicants: of these, 34 percent were approved and 
40.8 percent of those approved were appointed. (By letter dated 
February 24, 1988 from Committee Chair David G. Trager). 
59Results of a nationwide study undertaken in 1985 indicate 
that a higher percentage of women and minorities were selected to 
be judges in state courts through some type of appointive process 
than through partisan or nonpartisan elections. The Success Of 
Women And Minorities In Achieving Judicial Office: The Selection 
Process, 69 (Fund for Modern Courts, Inc. 1985). According to 
M.L. Henry, Jr., the Executive Director of the Fund for Modern 
Courts, who testified at our hearings, these results have not 
been contradicted in the two years since the study was published. 
II Tr. at 230. The fact that women and blacks have done 
considerably better under appointive systems nationwide was 
corroborated by the hearing testimony of Frances Zemans, the 
Executive Director of the American Judicature Society. I Tr. at 
235. 
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underrepresentation of such groups in the judiciary does not of 
itself argue in favor of elective systems. 
3. Community Values And Common Sense 
The notion that judges should have a feel for their 
community and empathy with the practical needs of those who 
appear before them is compelling. However, we are not persuaded 
that near-exclusive recruitment of judges from political ranks is 
the best way to foster community awareness and common sense on 
the bench. Political service in a club or county headquarters is 
only one of many ways in which judicial candidates can acquire 
these traits, and a proper method of judicial selection should be 
open to qualified candidates from all backgrounds. 
More important, the need for judges with experience 
and sensitivity of this kind can and should be satisfied without 
compromising judicial independence. When individuals ascend to 
the bench their break with politics should be complete, even as 
they carry the lessons of their practical experience with them. 
D. Conclusion: The Conflict Between Partisan 
Politics And Judicial Values 
The Commission's investigation has necessarily focused 
on specific illustrations of judicial election processes in New 
York State. Our investigation persuades us, however, that the 
conflict between party politics, on the one hand, and judicial 
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independence and nonpartisanship, on the other, is not peculiar 
to any of the local elective systems examined in this report. 60 
Rather, this conflict is inherent in the partisan nature of party 
activity and political elections. As our investigation shows, 
political parties are geared to reward loyalty, not merit; to 
discourage, not encourage, independence and diversity; and to 
obtain power rather than promote justice. Such goals, however 
valuable to the operation of the party system in general, have no 
place in the selection of our judges. 
We therefore conclude that the selection of judges 
should be removed as much as possible from the control of 
political parties. We further conclude that, to achieve this 
result, judicial elections should be eliminated. We have already 
considered, and rejected, partisan elections. Even nonpartisan 
elections -- in which each candidate's name appears on the ballot 
without party designation are inadequate. In the states 
where they have been used to select judges, the same defects that 
afflict partisan elections often manifest themselves: heavy 
reliance on campaign contributions; low voter identification with 
candidates; and the decisive influence of party affiliations, 
notwithstanding the absence of such information from the 
60rn particular, this conflict is not peculiar to Queens 
County. While Queens has served as an illustration in our 
report, its elective systems are not atypical of those in other 
areas of New York State. 
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ballot.61 We therefore recommend an appointive method for the 
selection of Supreme Court justices and judges of courts of 
limited jurisdiction. 
61M. Comisky and P. Patterson, The Judiciary - Selection, 
Compensation, Ethics and Discipline, 9-10 (1987). 
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III. Appointive Systems 
In this section we first briefly describe, by way of 
background, the forms of appointive systems currently in place in 
New York State. We then discuss the general principles that an 
appointive system should embody in order best to promote judicial 
independence and the broadest possible access to the bench. 
Finally, drawing on these general principles, we put forward our 
recommendations for the preferred method of appointing judges. 
A. Types Of Appointive Systems 
Judges in New York State are appointed either through a 
screening or a nominating process. In each process, an appointed 
committee evaluates candidates and makes recommendations to the 
executive vested with the appointing authority. But whereas 
nominating commissions recommend only a limited number of the 
most highly qualified candidates, screening committees recommend 
all well-qualified candidates, which normally results in a larger 
pool of candidates from which the executive must choose. 
1. Nominating Processes 
Two different nominating systems are in place in New 
York State: the State Commi~sion on Judicial Nomination (the 
''Nominating Commission"), which nominates seven candidates for 
Chief Judge and between three and seven candidates for Associate 
Judge to the Governor for possible appointment to the Court of 
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Appeals; and the Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary (the "Mayor's 
committee") in New York City, which nominates three persons for 
each vacancy to the Mayor for possible appointment to the Family 
and Criminal Courts and to Civil Court on an interim basis only. 
The Nominating Commission has both a constitutional and a 
statutory mandate,62 while the Mayor's Committee exists by 
Mayoral Executive Order only.63 
The Nominating Commission consists of 12 persons who 
reside in the state and serve four-year staggered terms: the 
Governor selects four (two from each party and two of whom may 
not be members of the bar), the Chief Judge of the Court of 
Appeals selects four (two from each party and two of whom may not 
be members of the bar), and the Speaker of the New York State 
Assembly, the Temporary President of the State Senate and the 
Minority Leaders of both the Assembly and the Senate each select 
one. The Commission members select their Chair from among their 
ranks. 64 
The Mayor's Committee is comprised of 27 persons, all 
62N.Y. Const. art. VI, section 2; N.Y. Jud. Law, sections 
61-68 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988). 
63Exec. Order No. 10, dated April 11, 1978, as amended by 
Exec. Order No. 87, dated December 6, 1985. 
64N.Y. Const. art. VI, section 2; N.Y. Jud. Law, supra, 
section 62. 
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of whom the Mayor appoints. The Mayor appoints 13 members 
without nominations and receives nominations for the remaining 14 
positions: six each by the Presiding Justices of the Appellate 
Division for the First and Second Judicial Departments, and 
nominations of one each by the deans of two New York City law 
schools (on an annual rotation basis). The Mayor also appoints 
the Committee Chair. All of the Committee members must reside or 
have their principal place of business in New York City. 65 
The Mayor's Committee also re-evaluates each appointed 
judge toward the end of his or her term. If the Mayor's 
Committee approves the judge for re-appointment, the Mayor 
automatically re-appoints the judge; if the Mayor's Committee 
fails to approve the judge, the Mayor denies re-appointment.66 
2. Screening Processes 
By Executive Order, the Governor has established 
screening committees in the four judicial departments across the 
state to recommend candidates for appointment to the Appellate 
Divisions and for appointment to the Supreme Court on an interim 
basis. In addition, the Executive Order provides for a State 
Judicial Screening Committee to recommend candidates for 
65Exec. Order No. 87, supra. 
66see Procedure and Policy of the Mayor's Committee on the 
Judiciary, Section 14, adopted March 2, 1978. 
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appointment to the Court of Claims, and County Judicial Screening 
Committees to recommend candidates for appointment to interim 
vacancies on the Family Court outside of New York City, the 
County Court and the Surrogate's Court.67 
Each Departmental Screening Committee consists of nine 
members: four selected by the Governor, two by the Chief Judge 
of the Court of Appeals, one by the Presiding Justice of the 
Appellate Division of the relevant department, and two 
collectively by the Speaker of the Assembly, the Temporary 
President of the Senate, and the Minority Leaders of the Senate 
and Assembly. The State Judicial Screening Committee consists of 
the Chairs of each of the Departmental Judicial Screening 
Committees (appointed by the Governor from among the Committee 
members) and two other members selected by the Governor from 
each Departmental Screening Committee. Finally, each County 
Judicial Screening Committee consists of the members of the 
Departmental Judicial Screening Committee for the relevant county 
and one additional person selected by the chief executive officer 
of the relevant county.68 Committee members must reside or work 
in the judicial department or county in which they are to serve. 
67Exec. Order No. 9, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. section 4.9 (March 4, 
1983). 
68rd. 
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B. General Principles For An Appointive System 
Appointive systems, like elective systems, are exposed 
to politics at several levels: the selection of members of the 
nominating commission or screening committee; the choice of 
nominees; and finally the executive's appointment from among the 
nominees. However, it is possible to design appointive systems 
that minimize political influence because, unlike elective 
systems, they can be removed from both the control of party 
organizations and the pressures of election campaigns. For 
these reasons, appointive systems can better achieve the goals of 
protecting the independence of the judiciary and promoting fair 
access to the bench by the broadest possible pool of qualified 
candidates.69 
A proper appointive system can promote judicial 
independence by minimizing political pressures on judges. 
Judicial appointment of course eliminates the concern with 
campaign fundraising. Moreover, by narrowing if not eliminating 
the discretionary power of party leaders over judgeships, 
appointment also undercuts the need to cultivate ties with and 
maintain the favor of local party organizations. In any system 
in which a judge's selection depends in whole or in part on the 
69Thus, it may be no coincidence that, of the more than 30 
states that over the past 35 years have replaced their elective 
systems in whole or in part with appointive systems, none has 
reverted to elections. The nationwide trend is unmistakably 
toward appointive systems. See I Tr. at 233-34 (Zemans). 
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actions of political officials, that fact may affect a judge's 
perception of his or her role. An appointive process, however, 
can remove at least the most direct pressures -- those that stem 
from the elected judge's perceived debt to the political party 
leader. 
To the extent that the appointment process wrests 
control over judgeships from political leaders, it also opens 
judicial positions to qualified candidates who are otherwise 
excluded because of their lack of political party service or 
clout. Once potential candidates know that they do not need a 
political connection to be considered seriously by a screening or 
nominating committee and to obtain appointment to the bench, the 
appointive process should be able to attract a broader pool of 
well-qualified candidates than any elective system.70 
In order best to realize these advantages an appointive 
system should, in our judgment, embody the principles that are 
set forth below. 
70Indeed, several witnesses testified at the hearings that, 
to the extent statistical evidence exists, it supports the 
proposition that, in New York and across the nation, appointive 
processes attract a more diverse pool of judicial candidates 
than do elective processes. See testimony of Frances Zemans, 
Executive Director of the American Judicature Society (I Tr. at 
238-39), Robert Kaufman, President of the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York (I Tr. at 266), Anthony Palermo, Chair of 
the Fourth Department Screening Committee (II Tr. at 258-60, 273-
74) and M.L. Henry, Jr., Executive Director of the Fund for 
Modern Courts (II Tr. at 267-69). 
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1. An Appointive System Should Significantly 
Constrain Executive Discretion Over Appointments 
An appointive system should constrain executive 
discretion over appointments by restricting the number of 
nominees from which the executive must choose. After all, the 
appointing executive may be as politically motivated as a party 
organization leader. For this reason, a nominating process, in 
which the executive must choose from among a small number of the 
best candidates, is preferable to a screening process, which 
allows the executive to choose from a potentially unlimited 
number of candidates. Limiting the number of nominees from which 
the executive must choose also helps foster judicial independence 
by increasing the role of the commission and, in that way, 
reducing the debt that a successful nominee might feel toward the 
executive who appointed him or her. 
The screening process, to be sure, has the merit of 
limiting nominees to exactly the number of candidates found well-
qualified. However, under a nominating system the problem of 
including unqualified candidates can be addressed by requiring 
the commission to nominate only those candidates who are found to 
be well-qualified. 
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2. The Composition Of The Nominating Commission Should 
Reflect A Broad Spectrum Of Community Interests 
The nominating commission itself should be multi-
partisan, if not nonpartisan, and broadly representative of the 
demographic make-up of the community served. These features 
broaden access to judicial office by ensuring that nominations 
are the result of a cross-section of views. Moreover, they work 
to minimize the intrusion of party politics by neutralizing the 
power of any one faction within the commission, and by lessening 
the likelihood that the commission will come under the sway of 
the executive. A broad spectrum of represented interests also 
rebuts what is perhaps the most common allegation against 
appointive processes, namely that they are "elitist" and mirror 
the preferences of the established bar. 
Accordingly, the members of each nominating commission 
should be appointed, not by one central authority, but by a range 
of government authorities appropriate to the community served. 
Furthermore, there should be limits on the number of commission 
members who belong to any one political party or who are members 
of the bar. And both commission members and the government 
authorities responsible for appointing judges should be 
officially charged with the goal of carrying out their duties in 
a nonpartisan fashion. 
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3. The Nominating Commission System Should Be 
Significantly Decentralized 
A decentralized system of nominating commissions is 
essential in order both to facilitate community involvement in 
the selection of judges and to attract a diverse pool of 
candidates. Accordingly, each judicial district and other 
relevant locale should have a nominating commission, and a 
portion of its members should be selected by local political 
officials. Moreover, all of the members of each commission 
should reside or work in the geographical area it serves. Each 
commission should also actively recruit qualified judicial 
candidates from all segments of the relevant community. 
Toward this same end, the authority for the selection 
of judges should also be decentralized. In contrast to most 
current court reform proposals for New York State, which lodge 
the power of appointment almost exclusively with the Governor,71 
we prefer that the Governor's appointment power be restricted to 
a few courts and that appropriate local authorities, such as the 
mayor or county executive, appoint judges to most local courts. 
71see, ~, the Governor's Program Bill No. 186, 
S.8246/A.9939, 211th Session (1988) ("Governor's Program's 
Program Bill No. 186 11 ). This bill gives exclusive appointment 
power to the Governor -- except for certain Mayoral appointments 
in New York City -- in the context of court merger, which would 
consolidate various trial courts into a single court system. 
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4. Sitting Judges Should Not Have To 
Face Re-election 
In light of our investigation of elective systems, it 
is imperative that judges not have to face the sometimes chilling 
prospect of securing political support or financial resources for 
their re-election. The appointive system should therefore 
provide. for the automatic retention of an incumbent judge for a 
new term upon a finding by the nominating commission, in the last 
year of his or her current term, that the judge has served 
competently and with integrity. This feature is preferable to 
requiring, as do some appointive proposals, that judges seeking 
re-election submit to an uncontested retention election.72 This 
referendum-like feature unnecessarily exposes sitting judges to 
what Chief Judge Wachtler termed "the inherent danger" that even 
uncontested judicial elections will be unduly politicized.73 
5. The Work Of The Nominating Commission Should 
Be Subject To Public Scrutiny 
Finally, some public scrutiny of the work of the 
nominating commission is essential to help ensure that it 
operates fairly. We realize that the identities of applicants, 
72see, ~' Governor's Program Bill No. 186, supra, 
section 12; Chief Judge's Proposal For Retention Election Of 
Sitting Judges, S.8247/A.10791, 211th Session (1988), section 1. 
73r Tr. at 21. Chief Judge Wachtler testified that 
uncontested retention elections are preferable to the present 
partisan elections, but that an appointive method is preferable 
to both. See id. at 11-12, 21. 
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the data collected concerning them and their evaluation by the 
commission must remain confidential in order to encourage well-
qualified candidates to apply and to protect their privacy. But 
the nominating commission should be required to maintain and 
disclose statistical information on, for example, the numbers of 
applicants, the numbers and percentages of minority group and 
female applicants, and the numbers and percentages of minority 
group and female applicants who are nominated and appointed. 74 
Not compiling or disclosing such statistical information serves 
no useful purpose and can only undermine public confidence in the 
appointive process. 
c. Recommendations 
The Commission recommends amending the New York State 
Constitution to provide for an appointive system for the 
selection of all Supreme Court justices and judges of courts of 
limited jurisdiction. We conclude that, in light of the 
foregoing principles, the following seven features embody the 
best appointive system for New York State: 
1. Nominating commissions for Supreme Court should be 
7 4only the Mayor's Committee and the Screening Committee for 
the First Department made available to the Commission such 
information in meaningful detail. The other departmental and 
statewide screening committees provided at most limited 
statistical information, and the State Commission on Judicial 
Nomination declined on grounds of confidentiality to provide the 
Commission with any information beyond the names of the nominees 
and appointees for each vacancy and the mailing list utilized to 
seek applicants. 
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established in each judicial district, and nominating commissions 
for courts of limited jurisdiction should be established in the 
appropriate geographical area. These locales range in size from 
the entire state (Court of Claims) to individual cities (City 
Courts).75 
2. Members of each nominating commission should be 
selected by a range of relevant government authorities. In the 
case of each nominating commission, four officials or groups of 
officials should have the power to appoint roughly equal numbers 
of commissioners: the Governor; the four majority and minority 
leaders of the State Senate and Assembly (with each leader 
enjoying equal appointing power); the Chief Judge of the State of 
New York and the Presiding Justice or Justices of the relevant 
Appellate Division or Divisions (with the Presiding Justice or 
Justices enjoying an appointing power roughly equal to that of 
the Chief Judge); and officials from the relevant geographical 
area, such as the mayor and/or county executive. In all cases, 
the commission members themselves should select the chair from 
among their own ranks. 
75Many current court reform proposals include provisions for 
court merger. See, ~' the Governor's Program Bill No. 186, 
supra. Court merger would greatly simplify the nominating 
commission scheme by making the judicial district the sole 
jurisdictional unit throughout the State. The Commission, 
however, takes no position as to the merits of court merger, 
since it raises issues that are outside the scope of our 
Executive Order. 
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3. The authorities who appoint commission members 
should be officially charged with the goal of achieving as broad 
a range of community representation on the commission as 
possible. The commission members themselves should also be 
charged with the goal of acting in a nonpartisan manner in 
carrying out their duties. In order to help ensure that these 
goals are achieved, limits should be set on the number of 
commission members who may belong to any one political party and 
who may be members of the bar. In addition, all of the 
commission members should reside or work in the geographical 
area that is served. Commission members should also be barred 
from holding any judicial or elected public office or any office 
in a political party during their periods of service. Moreover, 
they should be ineligible for appointment to judicial off ice 
during a prescribed period after their service on the commission. 
4. Each nominating commission should broadly and 
promptly disseminate public notice of every judicial vacancy as 
well as the procedures prospective candidates should follow. In 
addition, commission members should actively recruit prospective 
candidates who appear to be qualified. The commissions should 
adopt written, uniform procedures for screening candidates and 
evaluating candidates. These procedures should include the 
following elements. 
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Each candidate should be required to submit a 
questionnaire detailing his or her personal and professional 
background and qualifications. Counsel to the commission and a 
subcommittee designated by the chair should preliminarily screen 
candidates by reviewing their questionnaires and conducting a 
thorough investigation to obtain an accurate view of the 
candidate's integrity, professional competence and probable 
judicial temperament. This investigation should include 
contacting as many individuals and institutions as is deemed 
necessary. counsel should then prepare a written report of the 
investigation of each screened candidate and submit it along with 
the questionnaire to the full commission for review. The chair 
should then convene commission meetings to discuss the 
questionnaires and reports and to interview each screened 
candidate. 
Following this interview, the members should discuss 
the merits of the candidates and then vote, ranking the 
candidates in order of preference and determining whether they 
are well-qualified or not. This vote should be conducted openly 
within the commission, to minimize the risk of partisan or other 
unfair forms of voting. Commission members should vote only for 
as many candidates as there are potential nominees. For each 
vacancy, the commission should nominate a small number of 
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candidates, provided each has been found well-qualified by a 
majority of the commission members.76 
5. The executive vested with the authority to 
appoint judges should vary depending on the nature and 
jurisdiction of the court. The Governor should appoint nominees 
to the Supreme Court and the Court of Claims, both of which are 
courts with statewide jurisdiction. The Governor, in our view, 
should also appoint nominees to the Surrogate's Court, because of 
the extraordinary powers of the judges on that court. The 
Governor's power of appointment should be subject to confirmation 
by the State Senate. The relevant mayor should appoint judges to 
City Courts, to Family Courts in New York City, and to Civil and 
Criminal Courts (which exist only in New York City). The 
relevant county executive should appoint judges to County and 
District Courts and to Family Courts outside of New York City. 
Each appointing executive must make his or her appointment from 
the list of nominees within a prescribed period of time. Each 
appointing executive should also be officially charged with the 
goal of acting in a strictly nonpartisan manner in making 
judicial appointments. 
76rn most proposals, the number of nominees for one vacancy 
ranges from three to five, with an additional two nominees for 
each additional vacancy in cases of multiple vacancies. 
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6. If an incumbent judge seeks re-appointment, the 
judge must so inform the commission in the last year of his or 
her term. Following a process of investigation and interview 
similar to what has already been described, the commission 
· members must decide by majority vote whether the incumbent judge 
is qualified to serve another term. If so, re-appointment 
should be automatic. 
7. Each nominating commission should be subject to 
certain confidentiality provisions. However, each commission 
should also be required to compile, maintain and make publicly 
available statistical information on applicants, nominees and 
appointees, including the number of applicants, the numbers and 
percentages of minority group and female applicants, and the 
numbers and percentages of minority group and female applicants 
who are nominated and appointed. 
* * * 
We urge these recommendations because, in our judgment, 
they are best calculated to preserve the independence of the 
judiciary and justify public confidence in the integrity of the 
judicial system. In considering the selection of our judges, 
nothing less than the best possible method will suffice. We 
Judicial Selection Report 
May 19, 1988 
Page 63 
expect much of judges: independence, courage, honesty, ability, 
knowledge, understanding and compassion. Accordingly, it is 
imperative that we have the best and most qualified people 
serving on the bench. Our recommendations have been designed to 
achieve that end. 
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